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New Markets for
Local Experts in Africa?
Dirk Kohnert
I. Roots of the Fashionable Call
for Local Experts
In recent years the call for an increasing involvement of local experts
in planning and evaluation of development projects has steadily in-
creased.4 This applies to sub-Saharan Africa too, although it may be
considered a special case: first, because of the considerable depen-
dency of African states (most of them LLDCs) on development aid
(high "aid ratio" compared with GNP or state budget), and second,
because it is said that consulting and management qualifications are
relatively low developed in Africa compared with Asia or Latin
America. Nevertheless, there exists a growing pressure by African
governments and NGO's, vis a vis foreign donors, to employ more lo-
cal experts. This demand has increasingly been considered as justi-
fied, not just by churches or other NGOs, but even by major donor
agencies of official development aid, for the following reasons:
• All parties concerned share - at least rhetorically - the same basic
aims and policies of development cooperation, i.e. self-reliance,
guarantee of sustainability of development projects by the use of
indigenous resources, the principle of subsidiary aid, and last not
least, the desire to learn from one another; therefore, an equal, or
even predominant part concerning employment of local experts
has been demanded.
4
 cf. Jaycox (1993); Braun (1993); Hampel (1993); DAC 1992. By "local experts" we un-
derstand national experts who live and work in the country where they are meant to use their
expertise; "international experts" (expatriates) by contrast are those experts, employed out-
side the borders of their homeland; i.e. Africans, too, may either be "local" or "internatio-
nal" experts, depending on iheir nationality, qualification and contract.
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• More than half of the aid money for Africa (about 60 % accord-
ing to UNDP estimates; cf. Berg 1993) was spent in the past for
salaries of expatriate technical staff. In some African countries,
recurrent costs of expatriate experts and volunteers go even
beyond state expenditure for government employees. Therefore,
the political pressure by both donors and recipient countries for a
major stake of local experts in development projects cannot be
overheard. For African governments and radical Western liberal
economists alike, it would be the best to substitute "technical" by
"financial" cooperation", i.e. to transfer the aid money directly to
recipient governments or NGOs on which the latter could decide
independently. International donor agencies are increasingly re-
sponsive to these demands, not just because of shared common
aims (see above), but also because of "economies" employing
"cheap" local experts in view of stagnant financial resources and
growing criticism of the ineffectiveness of development aid.
• For at least two decades, local experts has been increasingly
recognized and used (by the international donor community) as
"door openers" for their expatriate counterparts because of their
intimate knowledge of the socio-cultural and political setting of
their home country, and because of their personal affiliation to
major decision makers in domestic governmental or implement-
ing agencies. Therefore, they are considered to be an indispens-
able part of any international planning- or evaluation team.
• The availability of (by international standards) qualified local de-
velopment experts is growing, even in many least developed
countries in Africa. However, as in these countries there does not
yet exist an effective independent domestic demand for the ser-
vices of local experts, the latter are still, to a great degree, depen-
dent on contracts of foreign donor agencies. Domestic demand
will be even further restricted by the effects of structural adjust-
ment programmes in the near future. Therefore, "locals" are
trying to compete on the same terms with foreign international
development experts.
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• In addition, local experts - just like other professionals in the
world - are keen to reserve a greater piece out of the "cake" of
the consulting market in LLDCs (financed by the international
donor community) for themselves.
• Local experts of African LDCs (e.g. Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria)
are gradually gaining bargaining power doing consulting for
foreign donor agencies, both at local and international levels.
This, however, is not due just to growing individual qualification.
But it may be considered, as well as the effect of corporate strat-
egies of the concerned, i.e. of creating professional organisations
and pressure groups and/or by advocating "closed shops", in de-
limitation against expatriates, as well as against the so-called "pi-
rates" in the business, i.e. unorganized local competitors. These
are said to be unqualified by international standards or suspected
of offering their services at dumping prices. Concerning this po-
litical or other lobbying, the backing of their demands by African
governments may be taken for granted, as the network of clien-
teles in African countries is for specific socio-cultural reasons
even more effective than in Western countries.
2. On the Socio-cultural Setting
of Local Experts
The social structure and the socio-cultural setting in most African de-
veloping countries has been dominated since colonial times by clien-
teles, patronage, the socio-economic system of the "command state"
and prebend economy. Even the second wave of democratization,
experienced for about three years in African countries, will not
change this situation in the short run. On the contrary, there are indi-
cators that even in model cases like the Benin Republic, corruption
and nepotism among the newly elected elite are still increasing (cf.
Engel et al 1994:2-10).
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This may have strong repercussions on the work of local development
experts. First, because local experts belong as a rule to the upper
social strata of the society or the "intelligentsia", and they often share
the same socio-cultural background as the new breed of the political
class of "technocrats", dominating many of the new democratically
elected governments, like in Benin, Senegal or Cote d'Ivoire. As
these experts are deeply rooted in their socio-cultural system, they too
must honour the demands of clienteles and the prebend economy,
otherwise they are threatened by economic and social sanctions.
These sanctions are related to the degree of disrespect of established
"traditional" rules of solidarity vis a vis their own extended family,
ethnic- or peer group; already the threat of sanctions has to be consi-
dered as effective, because these threats - extending even into the
realm of supernatural threats (e.g. magic and witchcraft) - apparently
still exert greater power in African countries than in most other de-
veloping countries. The same applies to ethnicity, which - considering
the high degree of monopolization of political power in Africa - is an
effective barrier to capacity building. Decision makers build up
distrust against anyone who could threaten them intellectually or
professionally, especially if he belongs to another ethnic group (cf.
Jaycox 1993:73). In view of such a considerable social and economic
pressure, the independence of judgement and action of local experts
is supposed to be seriously affected and endangered in cases of con-
flict between their role as expert and their role within the clientele
system in which they are embedded.
Second, experts, in general, are supposed to have a certain distortion
of judgement or blinkers vis a vis the analysis of their own society;
given the social background of local experts in African LDCs (see
above), we have to pose the question as to whether many of them are
not exposed to even greater bias in relation to certain basic problems
of development planning (e.g. concerning the recognition of gender-,
environmental- or human rights problems, or concerning concepts of
the "poor" and poverty-oriented planning). According to my own
experience in West Africa for example, local experts are often less
target group and poverty oriented. Either because, according to their
standards, anybody living in the countryside is considered to be a
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poor "small-holder", or because they have to honour their obligations
vis a vis political or administrative decision makers in their country,
who (e.g. as part-time farmers) want to get their piece of the "cake",
They may be even less accepted by the poor, because the latter con-
sider them to be part of the suppressive state structure. Even though
expatriate experts more often than not do share the same status bar-
riers in communication with the poor, and do have the disadvantage
of not being able to talk to the target groups without an interpreter,
they often profit from the fact that they are not involved in local politi-
cal, ethnic or religious antagonisms. The latter, however, may very
well be the case, e.g. of a Yoruba consultant, doing interviews on
sensitive issues with Hausa peasants in Northern Nigeria.
Third, according to own experience in West Africa, local experts in
African LLDCs are especially liable to back outdated development
theories, like theories of modernization, relying principally on the
transfer of technology. This point has been raised, not trying to assert
that the undue reliance on concepts of technology transfer has been
already eradicated within the circles of the international expert com-
munity. But professional blindness, e.g. vis a vis indigenous innova-
tions by African peasants and peasant experimentation, is especially
difficult to overcome in the presence of vested interests of the upper
class in accelerated growth according to the lines of Western devel-
opment. This holds even more true in case the experts should be in-
terested not just in the transfer of technology, but also in the transfer
of equipment, inputs, and finance, incorporated in this technology and
benefiting more or less directly the upper class to which they belong
(cf. Kohnert/Weber 1991).
We have to stress once again: all this has nothing to do with the lack
of academic or intellectual qualification; therefore the biases mention-
ed above are (if at all) difficult to eliminate by training-programmes
for the promotion of local experts or by government programmes for
"capacity building" or to improve "good government" as promoted
by the World Bank (cf. Jaycox 1993).
67
3. On the Self-esteem of Local Experts
Quite a lot of local experts in Africa are nowadays - according to
their own opinion - as qualified and independent as their expatriate
colleagues. However, they deplore formal and informal market bar-
riers which prevent fair and equal competition on the international
market. They want them to be removed by the international donor
community. In addition, more stress should be put on "profes-
sionalism"; notably the so-called "pirates" should be thrown out of
business by giving contracts only to proven experts, honouring
professional "codes of conduct" and/or belonging to corporate profes-
sional organizations. Compared with their international competitors,
local experts, according to their own point of view, dispose of special
advantages, especially their familiarity with local languages, the
socio-cultural setting, and indigenous innovations; in addition they
consider themselves more accepted by implementing agencies as well
as by target groups (cf. the "S.W.E.T." - Model by Mbagathi 1993).
African experts see their major disadvantage, compared with their
Western colleagues, in the lack of equipment, capital, and internation-
al experience, as well as in insufficient training and access to donors.
These experts counter the assertion of special ideological or other
biases on the part of local consultants with the argument that the do-
nors are the ones who draft the terms of reference of contracts, and
that local experts do just what they are asked to do. Thus, i.e the
blame, if accepted at all, is put back on the donors in a rather techno-
cratic interpretation of their work, which seems to be even more wide-
spread among African than among Western experts.
4. Past Experience with Local Experts
4.1 The View of Foreign Donors and Expatriate Counterparts
Rhetorically, both donors and expatriates alike propagate the view
that local experts should be treated on an equal footing with their
foreign counterparts (see above fn. 2). In practice, however, local
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counterparts are still today most often used in Africa as "door ope-
ner" or as "junior brother", i.e. assistant, and they are treated and paid
accordingly. Two reasons are usually given for this. First, experience
showed in the past that the service of local experts was not very re-
liable. Often - it is said - they did not honour the terms of reference of
their contract, did not deliver the report in time (or not at ail), and
even if they delivered, the quality of the report and analysis was rather
low. Although these assertions are certainly exaggerated by Western
experts in the interest of fencing the market, there may be a grain of
truth in it. To begin with, local experts themselves readily admit that
there is still a great need of training and further qualification in almost
all African countries. But they maintain as well that local experts are
generally badly paid, and even in case they should receive an ade-
quate salary, they would have to give part of it to their "patrons",
and/or they have to honour the demands of their extended family. As
they are therefore always obliged to look for secondary sources of in-
come, they are mostly short of time. In addition, they may hold the
view that it is only fair if they work according to pay, i.e. low quality
for low payment, both measured by international standards. The low
payment, and here we come to our second point, is at least partly ex-
plained by donor agencies with the situation of the domestic labour
market in African LDCs, where they are advised by governments and
national NGOs alike not to pay too high salaries in order to prevent
distortions of the local salary structure, and to stop or even reverse the
brain drain.
4.2 The View of Implementing (Partner) Organisations
The view of the implementing agencies in recipient countries corre-
sponds a great deal to the view of the local experts, with one or two
important distinctions. Local governments and NGOs do want donors
to pay more for "institution building" and "human capital devel-
opment" in general, i.e. for training of staff on all levels in order to re-
duce dependency on external expertise, whether local or foreign. In
general, technical assistance is considered to be imposed by donors.
Therefore, national partners of bilateral official aid - recently joined
by World Bank officials (cf. Jaycox 1993:74) - urge international do-
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nors to replace technical cooperation by direct transfer of aid money
in order to be able to employ their own national consultants, if it
should prove to be necessary. And finally, most partners overseas
(especially from the NGO sector) want foreign donors to respect the
national wage structure, and not to create an artificial demand which
siphons away the best qualified manpower and contributes to the al-
ready severe brain drain in Africa.
4.3 The View of Target Groups
Empirical studies on the perspective "from below", i.e. the view of the
target groups, on relative advantages of employment of local versus
expatriate experts in development projects in Africa are still scarce.
However, available evidence points in the direction that expatriate
volunteers and experts are often seen as a positive anti-stereotype to
national project staff (cf. Elwert-Kretschmer/Elwert 1991: 342-349).
Out of bad experiences with failed development projects in Africa
over the past two or three generations, target groups are in general
quite skeptical concerning innovations and recommendations of both
white or black experts. Therefore, they are mainly interested in the di-
rect transfer of inputs and credit down to the grass-roots. In this
respect, the "white" expert, as a rule, is held to be the one directly re-
sponsible to be addressed; sometimes he is even considered to be a
more impartial broker of development aid than his "junior colleague",
the local expert, who may be exposed to the suspicion - on the part of
the villagers - of siding with those representatives of the state or the
political class who are said to be mainly interested in exploiting the
peasantry.
5. The Quest for a New Division of Labour
between Local and International Experts
In view of the points made above, an unconditional assistance of
training and employment of local counterparts - as suggested by Jay-
cox (1993) and others - would be counter-productive with respect to
target group- and poverty-oriented development policies. Under the
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prevailing socio-cultural conditions of clienteles, the command state
and the prebend economy in Africa, such a policy would not only in-
crease disallocation of project funds, it would probably spread cor-
ruption and nepotism, and thus promote social differentiation rather
than alleviating poverty. In short, such a policy would be neither ef-
fective nor sustainable. The negative effects of such a policy would
even multiply if donors were to agree to recent demands of Western
and African decision makers (cf. Hampel 1993:19) to replace techni-
cal assistance by budget aid, enabling indigenous implementing
agencies to employ local experts in line with their proper aims and
interests.
Instead, what should be required now is an increased but conditional
technical cooperation which would meet the requirements of the
overall aims of poverty alleviation and self-reliance. To this end we
recommend a new division of labour between local and international
experts according to the comparative advantages of either group. Lo-
cal experts should concentrate on consulting for and in the interest of
the target groups and be trained, paid, and employed accordingly.
International experts (including Africans) should concentrate on
technical and management consultance for international donors or
national implementing organisations (African governments and
NGOs). In order to prevent a further consolidation of the "two tiers
society of consultants" of the past, it should be seen to that local ex-
perts are no longer misused as "door openers" for their expatriate
senior colleagues.
The task of consulting target groups is a very demanding task, both
concerning professional qualification, e.g. as moderator and facilitator,
and technical knowledge, as well as concerning the physical and
psychological stress of working and living for weeks or even months
together with the poor under deprived local conditions. At present
very few local, and probably even fewer foreign experts, do have
these qualifications as well as the will to do this job. A great deal of
training, and maybe even a kind of "re-education", e.g. exposure
programmes or training together with members of target groups,
would be necessary to create a pool of this new breed of target group
consultants. In order to find consultants really qualified, independent
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of their patronage network, and dedicated to this task, it has to be
valued and paid accordingly, that is at least as much as that of
international experts. Thus, the tricky problem of interference in the
domestic salary structure would still remain unsolved however.
In view of a target group- and poverty-oriented development policy,
the relationship between local and international experts should be re-
versed; consultant-teams should be directed by target group specia-
lists, responsible for the general orientation of the project or
programme. International experts should assist them concerning the
planning or evaluation of implementation of the programme.
For the time being these propositions are still far from having realistic
chances of implementation. There are too many counteracting vested
interests on the side of nearly all parties involved. As international
experts, Africans still have to cope with informal barriers to access to
decision makers of major international donors, and it would be
unrealistic to expect radical changes in this respect in the near future.
Therefore it will be difficult for them to compete with their Western
colleagues in this realm of consulting. However, concerning consul-
ting target groups there still exists an unexplored market in which lo-
cal experts would have considerable comparative advantage vis a vis
expatriates, if they could only overcome the barriers of elite-thinking
and of clienteles. Why not assist them in taking advantage of this si-
tuation to promote market differentiation and development in the
above indicated direction? Networks like ILEIA, financed by the
Dutch government, the French Reseau Recherche-Développement, or
the recent promotion of an African counterpart of a big rural, regional
integrated development project, assisted by German official
development aid as director of a German GTZ-team in a neighbour-
ing African country, are the first encouraging examples in the right
direction.
.
...
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